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I.

INTRODUCTION

“[T]he practice of medicine is not a business and can
never be one . . . . Our fellow creatures cannot be dealt
1
with as a man deals in corn and coal . . . .”
“The virtue-based physician could never see his patient as
a ‘customer,’ consumer, insured life or any other
commercialized, industrialized transformations of the
2
ancient and respectable word ‘patient.’”
“Patients have always been consumers. Before health
insurance was common, they shopped in a market for
medical services just as they shopped in a market for
3
toasters and tailors.”
In January 2011, a patient, a not yet pregnant mother (and her
husband), went to a medical office in Florida seeking obstetrical
4
care. Upon becoming a patient of the office, she executed an
arbitration agreement covering medical liability claims. Florida has
a statute providing for voluntary arbitration of medical negligence
5
claims but she never requested arbitration pursuant to this statute.
6
Although she “willingly signed the arbitration agreement,” which
stated, “the parties waive the right to a jury trial and consent to
arbitrate all claims arising out of or related to medical care and

1. THE QUOTABLE OSLER 53 (Mark E. Silverman et al. eds., 2008).
2. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Professionalism, Profession and the Virtues of the Good
Physician, 69 MT. SINAI J. MED. 382, 382 (2002).
3. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 644 (2008).
4. Santiago v. Baker, 135 So. 3d 569, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
5. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207 (West 2011).
6. Santiago, 135 So. 3d at 571. The opinion states that “[the] record reflects
no coercion or duress.” Id.
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7

treatment,” one wonders if the execution of the arbitration
8
agreement was a condition of treatment; an assumption to which I
will adhere for the purposes of this paper.
The patient had been taking a medication “to treat a chronic
9
disease.” She took an at-home pregnancy test, which returned a
10
positive result. The clinic, however, advised the patient “that the
11
12
pregnancy was nonviable,” and recommended a D&C procedure,
which the patient refused. The patient “resumed taking the drug,
allegedly believing that spontaneous passage of the fetus would
13
occur.” The patient “also alleged that she was unaware of the
14
possible adverse effects the drug might have on a fetus.” In fact,
the patient remained pregnant and gave birth to a child with severe
15
birth defects.
Thereafter, the patient and her husband sued the clinic and
her attending physician for medical negligence. The clinic
16
“successfully moved to compel arbitration.” The order compelling
arbitration was appealed and the trial court’s order was affirmed on
17
appeal.
Is it reasonable for a physician to condition treatment upon
the patient’s execution of an arbitration agreement? Is such an
agreement enforceable? Is such an agreement medically ethical?
This paper will address these topics (and others) in an effort to
determine whether a treatment conditioned upon the execution of
an arbitration agreement covering medical liability claims is

7. Id.
8. The Santiago occurrence at least suggested so. There, the Court stated:
“this agreement may reflect Dr. Baker’s ‘intention’ to require her patients to
forego their constitutional rights in order to receive medical service.” Id. at 572.
9. Id. at 570.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. “D&C is a surgical procedure in which the cervix is opened (dilated)
and a thin instrument is inserted into the uterus. This instrument is used to remove
tissue from the inside of the uterus (curettage).” The American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: SPECIAL PROCEDURES
(May,
2012),
http://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Dilation-and-CurettageDandC.
13. Santiago, 135 So. 3d at 570.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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consistent with, and should be a defensible component of the
physician-patient relationship.
II. REFLECTIONS ON THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Before examining the arbitration process and the practice of
conditioning medical treatment on the execution of an arbitration
agreement, it is useful to examine the physician-patient
relationship, at least in part from the patient’s perspective. The
patient arrives at a physician’s office and is required to provide
medical information to the office by completing forms. This
process may be challenging due to well-described general-literacy
18
and health-literacy issues. Nevertheless, the patient will complete a
medical history and provide medical insurance information. These
forms are significant as they relate to treatment and billing. It is
hoped, and, perhaps, it is reasonable to expect that patients are
able to comprehend the forms and complete them, or ask for
assistance in order to do so. Historically, patients have provided this
information to physicians’ offices. Despite literacy issues, it is the
custom and practice involving the creation of the physician-patient
relationship. Frankly, I do not believe that the formation of the
physician-patient relationship contemplates the execution of a legal
document—an arbitration agreement—which will so affect the
legal rights of the patient, should a claim for medical liability arise.
It has been keenly observed that, “[t]he patient is not just a
group of symptoms, damaged organs and altered emotions. The
patient is a human being, at the same time worried and hopeful,
19
who is searching for relief, help and trust.” As will be discussed
later in this paper, various codes and principles of medical ethics,
20
which will neither bind physicians nor courts, implore, or at least
encourage, physicians to act as patient advocates and assist with
patient access to health care. It is fair to question whether
conditioning treatment on the execution of an arbitration

18. Ruth Parker, Health literacy: A Challenge for American Patients and Their
Health Care Providers, 15 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L. 277, 277 (2000).
19. R. Kaba & P. Sooriakumaran, The Evolution of the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 5 INT’L J. SURGERY 57, 57 (2007).
20. See Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111, 115–16 (Ala. 2010) (noting that the
AMA’s ethics guidelines are “a non-binding code for ethical behavior by member
physicians”); Bryson v. Tinninghast, 749 P.2d 110, 114 (Okla. 1988) (noting that
medical “ethical standards are aspirational in nature and not enforceable by law”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/14

4

Ginsberg: The Execution of an Arbitration Provision as a Condition Preceden
8 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/24/2016 7:56 PM

THE EXECUTION OF AN ARBITRATION PROVISION

277

provision is consistent with the patient advocacy role of the
physician.
Some years ago, Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel outlined “four
21
models of the patient-physician interaction,” the paternalistic
model, the informative model, the interpretive model, and the
22
deliberative model. The paternalistic model envisions the
23
physician as guardian. The informative model contemplates the
physician as a fact provider, allowing the patient to utilize his or her
24
values in opting for treatment.
The interpretive model
contemplates that the physician will assist the patient “in
elucidating and articulating his or her values and in determining
what medical interventions best realize the specified values, thus
25
helping to interpret the patient’s values for the patient.” The
deliberative model contemplates “the physician . . . as a teacher or
friend, engaging the patient in dialogue on what course of action
26
would be best.”
These models represent reasonable approaches to the
physician-patient relationship. These models largely involve the
physician assisting the patient with health care decision-making.
They do not involve the physician attempting to alter the legal
relationship with the patient by compelling the execution of an
arbitration agreement.
Having reflected on the physician-patient relationship, it is
time to leave this topic and commence the examination of
arbitration. The physician-patient relationship will be re-examined
later in this paper.
III. ARBITRATION DEFINED
Prior to a discussion of arbitration in the context of medical
liability claims, there is value in defining the concept. Quite
fundamentally, arbitration, along with negotiation and mediation,
27
is a form or model of alternative dispute resolution. More
21. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L., Four Models of the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2222.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Kathleen A. Devine, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation, and
Proposals, 11 REV. LITIG. 83, 93 (1991).
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specifically, it has been defined “as a process for hearing and
deciding controversies of economic consequence arising between
28
parties” which “begins with and depends upon an agreement of
the parties to submit their claims to one or more persons chosen by
29
them to serve as their arbitrator.” Arbitration, as a form of
30
alternative dispute resolution, is intended as a substitute for trial.
The arbitration process, consisting “of six stages; initiation,
preparation, prehearing conferences, hearing, [decision-making],
31
32
and award” has been described in the literature.
It has been urged that “arbitration is an expression of party
33
autonomy.” The idea here is that arbitration is “a contractual and
consensual mechanism that grants very broad freedom to the
34
parties to define the manner of dispute resolution . . . .” This
paper will explore whether this arbitration characteristic
realistically applies to medical negligence claims and concludes
with the suggestion that arbitration of medical liability claims is
likely unconscionable and medically unethical.
IV. ARBITRATION, HISTORICALLY
A confession, of sorts, is appropriate here. Until I happened
35
upon Santiago v. Baker, despite many years of representing
physicians in professional negligence litigation, I was unaware that
physicians around the county had sought, and were seeking, from
patients the execution of arbitration agreements, which would
36
apply to professional negligence claims. This topic has received
28. Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration—What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1031
(1960).
29. Id.; see also Edward C. King & Don W. Sears, The Ethical Aspects of
Compromise, Settlement And Arbitration, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 454, 458 (1953).
30. Sturges, supra note 28 at 1032.
31. John W. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation—Explaining The Differences, 69
JUDICATURE 263, 264 (1986).
32. Id. at 264–66
33. Gary B. Born, Keynote Address: Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 15 (2009).
34. Id.
35. 135 So. 3d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
36. The author’s prior professional life focused on representing physicians in
Chicago, Illinois, a non-tort reform state. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l. Hosp., 930
N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (finding Illinois statutes instituting caps on non-economic
damages unconstitutional); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill.
1997) (invalidating reform measures on medical review panels, medical insurance
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38

attention in the literature, certainly from the 1970s, although, in
my estimation, it requires more attention with a focus on the
patient and an assessment of whether compulsory arbitration ought
to be embraced by the physician-patient relationship.
My point is simply that the classic use of arbitration did not
arise in a physician-patient context. Scholarship suggests that
arbitration has its origins (perhaps ancient) in commercial
39
disputes. This is more than reasonable as commercial disputes are
contract based. The physician-patient relationship has been
40
governed by tort law.
That said, the majority of physicians are aware of the possibility
of facing at least one medical negligence lawsuit in their respective
41
careers. Medical negligence litigation tends to be protracted,
42
expensive and uncomfortable. Compulsory arbitration of medical
liability claims provides an alternate forum within which to resolve
these disputes, if it is legally enforceable and medically ethical.
V. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA)
Although the notion of medical treatment conditioned upon
the patient’s execution of an arbitration agreement covering
potential medical liability claims is troublesome, it would be
and damage caps); Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976)
(invalidating newly enacted statutory provisions for medical review panels and
procedures); see also David M. Goldhaber & David Grycz, Three Strikes and You’re
Out: Illinois Supreme Court Invalidates Damage Cap, 24 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 30 (2010);
Marc D. Ginsberg, The Locality Rule Lives! Why? Using Modern Medicine to Eradicate an
Unhealthy Law, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 321 (2013) (referring to the above cited case and
literature regarding tort reform efforts in Illinois). Medical (including hospital)
negligence litigation remains quite active in Illinois.
37. See Irving Ladimer & Joel Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Laws,
Programs, Cases, 653 INS. L.J. 335 (1977); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized
Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1996).
38. See Ladimer & Solomon, supra note 37.
39. See Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83
U. PA. L. REV. 132 (1934); Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial
Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240 (1927).
40. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2 (2000); David A. Hyman &
Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global Perspective: How Does
the U.S. Do It?, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2012).
41. Anupam Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 N.
ENG. J. MED. 630 (2011).
42. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Five Myths of Medical Malpractice, 143
CHEST J. 222, 226 (2013).
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misleading to suggest that state law could simply outlaw this
43
practice. The FAA, section 2, provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
44
contract.
Section 2 of the FAA operates to preempt “state laws that
45
invalidate parties’ agreements to arbitrate,” thus reflecting a
46
“national policy favoring arbitration.” Federal preemption of state
law in this arena is “required by a line of Supreme Court cases
47
dating from Southland Corp. v. Keating.” In its recent decisions,
48
49
“Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. and AT&T v. Concepcion, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly decided that arbitration is an
50
adequate forum for litigants . . . .” Essentially, preemption by the
FAA will prohibit a state from refusing to enforce specific types of
arbitration agreements deemed unconscionable by the state, as that
51
approach would violate the policy of the FAA. Therefore, a state

43. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (West 2015). It has been noted that “[t]hese sections
comprise Chapter 1 of the FAA, which deals primarily with domestic arbitration.”
Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 393 n.1
(2004).
44. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947).
45. Drahozal, supra note 43 at 393.
46. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J. &
O’Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent was cited in Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes
Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 188
(2004).
47. See Drahozal, supra note 43 at 394 n.3 (citing Southland, 465 U.S. 1;
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. V. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr.’s. of Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ., 489 U.S. 486 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)).
48. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
49. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
50. Ramona Lampley, “Underdog” Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90
WASH. L. REV., *2–3 (forthcoming, Dec. 2015).
51. See Drahozal, supra note 43 at 402.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/14

8

Ginsberg: The Execution of an Arbitration Provision as a Condition Preceden
8 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/24/2016 7:56 PM

THE EXECUTION OF AN ARBITRATION PROVISION

281

law (or state court) that targets an arbitration agreement that was
executed by a patient as a condition of medical treatment as
52
unconscionable would likely not withstand FAA scrutiny. There is
a potential stumbling block to FAA application. The FAA only
53
applies to transactions “involving commerce.” “Commerce” is
54
supposedly defined in Section 1 of the FAA as :
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory and any State or
foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and
55
any State or Territory or foreign nation . . . .
This definition is not particularly helpful in determining if the
practice of medicine involves commerce. Arguably, a physicianpatient interaction is “local,” not involving interstate commerce. As
one court noted regarding a physician employment contract
dispute and the medical clinic’s effort to compel arbitration:
“Instead, the evidence [the clinic] did present failed to
demonstrate anything other than that it was a local clinic, with local
physicians who had privileges at local hospitals, and treated local
56
patients.” This approach, in the physician contract context, was
followed by an appellate court in affirming the denial of a motion
57
to compel arbitration.
The modern practice of medicine is not that simplistic—it is
not a stranger to commerce. Patients are mobile and seek
treatment from physicians outside of their home states. Physicians
utilize medical instruments, supplies and pharmaceutical products,
which move through commerce. Payers may include insurance
companies, which operate across the country, and Medicare, “the
58
federal health insurance program.” Since these factors have led to
52. See Fosler v. Midwest Care Ctr. II, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 1, 11–12 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009) (stating, “What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to
enforce all of its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce
its arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for that
kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly
contrary to the [FAA’s] language and Congress’s intent.”).
53. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947).
54. Id.
55. Id. at § 1.
56. Ark. Diagnostic Ctr. v. Tahiri, 257 S.W.3d 884, 891–92 (Ark. 2007).
57. Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, Inc., 731 S.E.2d 1, 4 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012).
58. What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-
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the application of the FAA to a nursing home admission contract
that includes a clause requiring arbitration of nursing home
59
negligence claims, arguably “the FAA would apply to nearly all
60
medical transactions.”
There is merit to this suggestion. Courts have held, without indepth explanation, that medical care provided by physicians and
61
clinics involves interstate commerce. The theory is that medical
treatment is a component part of economic activity that involves
62
interstate commerce. Of course, the difficulty with this “analysis”
is that it is non-analytical.
On the other hand, in finding that Title III of the Americans
63
with Disabilities Act regulates the practice of dentistry, one court
held that various “commercial activities” of dentists, including the
“purchase of supplies and equipment from out of state, receipt of
payments from out of state insurers and credit card companies, and
attendance of classes and conferences out of state . . . taken
together with the activities of other dentists similarly situated, have
an effect on interstate commerce substantial enough to fall within
the reach of congressional authority under the Commerce
64
Clause.” The FAA has been applied to an arbitration provision
contained in a physician’s employment contract based on a clinic’s
65
treatment of Medicare patients and receipt of Medicare payments.
Although the court found other evidence lacking regarding FAA
implication, it referred to other cases involving: (1) “acceptance of
out-of-state and multi-state insurer reimbursements,” (2) “purchase
and receipt of goods, equipment, medication, and services from
change-plans/decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
59. Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 787 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2009). See also, James C. Dunkelberger, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
The Plight of Health Care Arbitration Agreements Under Federal Law, 2010 BYU L. REV.
1869, 1887 (2010).
60. Dunkelberger, supra note 59 at 1887.
61. See Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 113 (Miss. 2006); Wilkerson v.
Nelson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 n.3 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (West 1990).
64. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 593 (D. Me. 1995). There, the
United States District Court for the District of Maine analyzed a claim against a
dentist for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Maine Human
Rights Act. Id.
65. Sutcliffe v. Mercy Clinics, Inc., No. 13-1974, 2014 WL 4631406, at *4
(Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014).
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out-of-state vendors,” (3) “out-of-state corporate offices,” (4)
“recruitment of physicians from out-of-state,” (5) “service to out-of66
state patients,” and (6) “receipt of federal funds.”
Therefore, it is fair to suggest that the practice of medicine
“involves commerce.” However, if a state court were to decide that
the practice of medicine is a local activity, not involving commerce,
then the court would apply state law to determine the
enforceability of an arbitration provision covering medical
negligence claims. That analysis will be explored when this paper
surveys the development of the law in the states.
VI. FUNDAMENTAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
The potential enforcement of an arbitration provision in a
contract for medical treatment, the execution of which is a
condition precedent of medical treatment, requires a review of
basic contract principles, specifically contracts of adhesion and
unconscionability. These topics have been well discussed in legal
67
scholarship.
A.

Contracts of Adhesion

Unquestionably, the arbitration provision upon which medical
treatment is conditioned constitutes a component part of a
contract of adhesion. The arbitration provision is a “standard form
document[],” which is given to the patient on a “take-it-or-leave-it
68
basis.” Professor Rakoff has identified the following characteristics
69
that “define a model ‘contract of adhesion’”:

66. Id. at *3 (citing Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661,
668 (Ala. 2004); Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785,
787–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); Fosler v. Midwest Care Ctr. II, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 1, 14–
15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); In re Tenet Healthcare, Ltd., 84 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex.
App. 2002)).
67. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts Of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983); Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form
Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327 (2010);
Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale
Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2012); Jeffrey C. Fort,
Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 765 (1978);
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2009).
68. See Rakoff, supra note 67 at 1177; see also PERILLO, supra note 67 at 348.
69. Rakoff, supra note 67 at 1177.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016

11

Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 14
8 (Do Not Delete)

284

3/24/2016 7:56 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:273

(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed
form that contains many terms and clearly purports to be a
contract.
(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party
to the transaction.
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of
the type represented by the form and enters into these
transactions as a matter of routine.
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the
representation that, except perhaps for a few identified items
(such as the price term), the drafting party will enter into the
transaction only on the terms contained in the document. This
representation may be explicit or may be implicit in the
situation, but it is understood by the adherent.
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are
open to bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent.
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type
represented by the form—few, at least, in comparison with the
drafting party.
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the
70
transaction considered as a whole is the payment of money.
Although these characteristics apply more specifically to
commercial agreements, they also apply “in the consumer context,
where they . . . are contracts of adhesion that consumers neither
71
read nor have the power to negotiate.” Required arbitration of
medical liability claims is a derivative of the consumer contract of
adhesion.
72
Contracts of adhesion are not necessarily unenforceable.
Unenforceability is typically a function of unconscionability, the
basics of which will be addressed now.
B.

Unconscionability

Unconscionability, as a contract defense, seems to require
extreme unfairness. Unconscionability has been well described as
follows:
Typically the cases in which courts have found
unconscionability involve gross overall one-sidedness or
gross one-sidedness of a term . . . . In these cases, one70.
71.
72.
1985).

See id.
Patterson, supra note 67 at 332.
See Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev.
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sidedness is often coupled with the fact that the
imbalance is buried in small print and often couched in
language unintelligible to even a person of moderate
73
education.
There are two categories of unconscionability: procedural and
substantive. “[P]rocedural unconscionability targets the quality of
74
. . . assent to the contract,” proof of which is “evidence of
‘oppression’ and ‘unfair surprise’ indicating that the transaction
75
lacked meaningful choice on the part of the complaining party.”
“[S]ubstantive unconscionability targets the content of the terms
themselves by looking for unfairness in the contract’s substantive
76
provisions.” Here, the focus is “on whether the allocation of risks
in the contract or one of its terms is commercially unreasonable or
77
unexpectedly one-sided.”
The classic application of the
unconscionability analysis requires a finding of both procedural
78
and substantive unconscionability, but “[t]he most troubling cases
are those in which there is overwhelming evidence of one form of
79
unconscionability and little evidence of the other form.”
With this basic review of fundamental contract principles, this
paper now surveys states in which compulsory arbitration of
medical liability claims has been sought, accepted, and rejected.
VII. SURVEYING THE STATES
A.

Tennessee

In Buraczynski v. Eyring, the Tennessee Supreme Court
considered, as a case of first impression, the enforceability of an
80
arbitration provision foisted upon a patient by a physician.
Buraczynski is an appropriate case with which to begin the survey of
states, as it involves all of the legal and policy issues implicated by

73. PERILLO, supra note 67, at 339.
74. Lonegrass, supra note 67, at 10.
75. Id. at 9 (citing U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2015)).
76. Id. at 10.
77. Id. at 10–11 (citation omitted).
78. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1067, 1073
(Summer, 2006).
79. Id.
80. 919 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tenn. 1996).
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81

the topic. Procedurally, it involves the consolidation of two
appeals concerning identical legal issues.
Two patients of Dr. Eyring, an orthopedic surgeon, engaged
82
him to perform total knee replacement surgery. They suffered
83
complications, resulting in medical negligence claims against him.
Dr. Eyring required each patient to execute a “Physician-Patient
84
Arbitration Agreement.” Medical treatment was conditioned upon
the execution of the agreements, although, one of the patients
85
executed her agreement post-surgery. The agreement, by its
terms, was retroactive to previous treatment provided to her by Dr.
86
Eyring, including the knee replacement procedure. The Court
highlighted the details of the agreements as follows:
The agreements are identical in all respects and require
arbitration of any and all medical malpractice claims by
the patient against the doctor. The provisions bind all
potential parties, including the patient’s spouse and heirs,
on all claims for medical negligence. In return, the
physician is bound by the arbitrators’ malpractice
decision, including any fee claims involved in the disputed
treatment. Finally, the patient has an unconditional right
to revoke the agreement by providing written notice to
87
the physician within thirty (30) days of signing.
The court’s opinion related other details of the compulsory
arbitration agreements. Each patient executed a single-page
88
arbitration agreement. “A short explanation was attached to each
document which encouraged the patient to discuss questions about
81. See id. at 314–22.
82. Id. at 316. One of the patients, Helen Parker, was the subject of another
case involving Dr. Eyring’s challenge to “the revocation of his staff appointment
and clinical privileges.” Eyring v. Fort Sanders Parkwest Med. Ctr., 991 S.W.2d 230,
232 (Tenn. 1999).
83. See generally Robert B. Bourne et al., Patient Satisfaction after Total Knee
Arthroplasty: Who is Satisfied and Who is Not?, 468 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED
RES. 57 (Jan. 2010); Paul F. Fortin et al., Outcomes of Total Hip and Knee Replacement:
Preoperative Functional Status Predicts Outcomes at Six Months After Surgery, 42
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 1722 (Aug. 1999); James E. Lovelock et al., Complications
of Total Knee Replacement, 142 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 985 (May 1984).
84. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 317 (noting that “the agreements signed by
[the patients] were presented to them on a ‘take it or leave it basis’”).
85. Id. at 316–17.
86. Id.
87. Id at 317.
88. Id. at 321.
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89

the agreement with [Dr.] Eyring.” The arbitration provision
contemplated three arbitrators and required the patient and Dr.
Eyring to each choose an arbitrator. Those arbitrators would select
90
a third arbitrator. The arbitrators’ decision bound Dr. Eyring and
the patients were advised that they are waiving their rights “‘to a
91
jury or court trial’ on any medical malpractice claim.” The Court
emphasized that “[f]inally, and perhaps most importantly, the
agreements did not change the doctor’s duty to use reasonable
care in treating patients, nor limit liability for breach of that duty,
92
but merely shifted the disputes to a different forum.”
Following the filing of the medical negligence actions, the
defendants moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied
the motions, basing that decision on the incompatibility of the
93
arbitration agreement with the Tennessee arbitration statute and
94
insufficient contract consideration. The cases were consolidated
95
on appeal and the trial court’s judgment was reversed. The Court
of Appeals held “that the nature of the physician-patient
96
relationship is unique and not a typical contractual relationship,”
97
that the Tennessee arbitration statute was applicable and “found
98
99
sufficient consideration to support the agreements in question.”
The Supreme Court of Tennessee “granted this appeal to consider
an important question of first impression—the enforceability of
100
arbitration agreements between physicians and patients.” In its
101
opinion, the court addressed the related issues of public policy,
102
breadth of the application of the arbitration agreements, and
103
contracts of adhesion.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302(a) (West 2015).
Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.3 (2d ed. 1998).
Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 317.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
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As to public policy, the Supreme Court stated “that no court
has ever reached the broad conclusion that public policy precludes
the use of private arbitration agreements in the area of medical
104
services.” This statement suggests the lack of an overarching
principle that would require a finding that the arbitration
provisions were unenforceable. Although recognizing the “unique
105
nature of the physician-patient relationship,” without explaining
106
it, the court held that arbitration is “advantageous,” not limiting
107
potential liability,
and designating a forum for dispute
108
As such, the court pronounced “that arbitration
resolution.
agreements between physicians and patients are not per se void as
109
against public policy.”
As to the breadth of the arbitration provisions, the court
simply dismissed the argument that the provision must be
110
treatment or procedure specific, citing California precedent.
Rather curiously, this precedent suggests that requiring a treatment
or procedure-specific arbitration provision would burden the
111
physician and emasculate the arbitration process by forcing the
physician to seek the execution of a new arbitration provision with
each change of the treatment regimen. Does that reasoning suggest
that compulsory arbitration places no burden on the patient?
Begging the question of “patient understanding,” the court
had no difficulty with the retroactive effect of the arbitration
provision which was executed after the patient received the medical
treatment which was the subject of the claim. Here, the court
simply concluded that because the patient “initialed the clause
which applied to the previously rendered treatment,” she “was
112
therefore obviously aware of it.” It is necessary to remember that
113
Buraczynski concerns “take it or leave it” arbitration. The patient
104. Id. at 318 (citing Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the
Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 949
(1972)).
105. Id. at 319.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Hilleary v. Garvin, 238 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Ct. App. 1987)).
111. Id. at 319.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 317 (stating “had the patients refused to sign, [the doctor]
would not have continued to treat them”).
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has no choice but to execute the agreement or find other
treatment. Under these circumstances, whether the patient is
“obviously aware” of the arbitration provision, its meaning, or
arbitration process is questionable, and will be the subject of
discussion in this article.
Turning to its discussion and analysis of adhesion contracts,
114
the court emphasized the “take it or leave it” character, i.e.,
115
required acquiescence, and that the patient “has no realistic
116
choice” of contract terms. The court concluded that the subject
arbitration agreements were adhesion contracts because: “the
agreements are standardized form contracts prepared by the
contracting party” the contracting physician has “superior
knowledge of the subject matter—the rendition of medical
services,” and the physician conceded the take it or leave it basis of
the agreement (a patient refusing to sign would no longer receive
117
medical care). Of course, the court noted that it’s finding that
the arbitration provisions were contracts of adhesion did not
118
require a finding of unenforceability.
Moving to the question of enforceability, the court emphasized
that its characterization of the arbitration agreements as contracts
119
of adhesion did not make the agreements unenforceable. Here,
the court stated that “[e]nforceability generally depends upon
whether the terms of the contract are beyond the reasonable
expectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or
120
unconscionable.” Unfortunately, the court did not state that
patient literacy or medical ethics were factors to consider. These
factors will be addressed later in some detail.
Instead, the court focused on whether the arbitration
provisions were hidden, “not afford[ing] the patients an
121
opportunity to question the terms or purpose of the agreement.”
Remarkably, the court concluded that the provisions were quite
fair, for the following reasons: the arbitration agreements were

114. Id. at 320.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Broemmer v. Abortion Serv.’s of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013,
1016 (Ariz. 1992)).
121. Id. at 321.
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separate, entitled documents; attached explanations suggested that
the patients discuss their questions about the agreements with the
physician; the specified arbitration procedure was fair; the
language of the agreement informed the patient of the waiver of a
court or jury trial; there were no hidden terms; the “retroactivity”
provision was separate and required the patient to initial it; the
patients could revoke the agreements within 30 days of execution;
and the agreements did not alter Dr. Eyring’s duty to exercise
122
reasonable care.
Finally, the court proclaimed that “[n]one of the above
described provisions can be construed as unconscionable,
oppressive, or outside the reasonable expectations of the parties. As
such, the agreements, though contracts of adhesion, are
123
enforceable.” Of course this proclamation was not based upon
any analysis of the reasonable expectation of a patient—a
layperson. Should a patient expect an arbitration agreement as a
condition of treatment? What is the likelihood that a patient could
understand a legal document that profoundly affects the patient’s
124
125
legal rights? This issue in “legal literacy” compounds wellknown and reported problems in general and health literacy—
problems that make physician-patient communication a
126
challenge. Furthermore, the court did not consider the medical
ethics of the compulsory arbitration agreement. Instead, the
Buraczynski court equates the physician-patient encounters with
127
arms-length business transactions—a misguided notion.
B.

Mississippi

In Cleveland v. Mann, the Supreme Court of Mississippi placed
its stamp of approval on an arbitration agreement, the execution of
128
which may have been compelled. Here, the defendant-physician,
122. Id.
123. Id. at 320
124. See generally James Boyd White, The Invisible Discourse of the Law: Reflections
on Legal Literacy and General Education, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 143 (1983) (discussing
the “degree of competence in legal discourse required for meaningful and active
life in our increasingly legalistic and litigious culture”).
125. Id.
126. See Mark V. Williams et al., The Role of Health Literacy in Patient-Physician
Communication, 34 FAM. MED. 383 (May 2002).
127. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320.
128. 942 So. 2d 108, 116 (Miss. 2006). “However, the parties dispute whether
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a surgeon, treated the patient for stomach cancer. The treatment
129
provided was a total gastrectomy. Following that procedure, at a
subsequent appointment for follow-up treatment for an apparent
surgical complication, an arbitration agreement was presented to
130
the patient. The patient executed the agreement and follow-up
131
surgery was performed nineteen days later. The patient required
132
additional surgery and continued to deteriorate until his death. A
medical negligence action was commenced, triggering a motion to
133
compel arbitration. The response to this motion urged that the
patient “did not enter into the agreement knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently, and the agreement violated the Mississippi
134
Arbitration Act.” The trial court denied the motion to compel
135
arbitration, based upon an unconscionable contract of adhesion,
136
having stated that this was an issue of first impression.
137
Following its discussion of the FAA and arbitrability, the
court undertook an analysis of procedural and substantive
unconscionability. Evidence of procedural unconscionability would
include “a lack of knowledge, lack of voluntariness, inconspicuous
print, the use of complex legalistic language, disparity in
sophistication or bargaining power of the parties and/or a lack of
opportunity to study the contract and inquire about the contract

the agreement was presented on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” Id. The dissent
referred to the arbitration agreement as “offered to the patient as a prerequisite to
necessary medical treatment.” Id. at 121.
129. Id. at 110. There is considerable medical literature discussing
grastectomy. See, e.g., Scott A. Hundahl et al., The National Cancer Data Base Report
on Poor Survival of U.S. Gastric Carcinoma Patients Treated with Gastrectomy, 88 CANCER
921 (2000); John R. T. Monson et al., Total Gastrectomy for Advanced Cancer, 68
CANCER 1863 (1991); Asgaut Viste et al., Postoperative Complications and Mortality
After Surgery for Gastric Cancer, 207 ANNALS SURGERY 7 (1988).
130. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 111.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. It should be noted that the response also raised the issue of whether
beneficiaries of the wrongful death claim could be bound by the provision, a topic
not addressed by this paper. For a very recent opinion on whether a non-signatory
to an arbitration agreement may be bound by the agreement. See Fiala v. Bickford
Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
135. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 111–12.
136. Id. at 113.
137. Id. at 112–13.
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138

terms.”
Evidence of substantive unconscionability focuses on
139
oppressive terms in the arbitration provision.
Applying these concepts, the court held that the arbitration
agreement
was
neither
procedurally
nor
substantively
unconscionable. Without citing any authority regarding “literacy”
the court disposed of the argument that the patient’s “lack of
140
education and inability to read or understand the agreement”
141
created “a disparity in the sophistication of the parties” and
procedural unconscionability. The court referred only to its prior
holding that “the inability to read does not render a person
incapable of possessing adequate knowledge of the arbitration
142
agreement he or she signed.” It seems unimaginable that the
court would so readily dismiss or discount the relationship between
reading ability and likelihood of understanding a legal
143
document.
The court next considered the claim that the arbitration
agreement was not explained to the patient, first by referring to the
patient’s signature on the first page of the agreement, providing as
follows: “NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE OR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL BINDING
ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT
144
TRIAL.” Additionally, the patient initialed each term, presumably
145
after a medical staff member explained each term.

138. East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 714 (Miss. 2002).
139. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 111–12.
140. Id. at 114.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing EquiFirst Corp. v. Jackson, 2005-CA-00621-SCT (¶ 19) (Miss.
2006)).
143. See Barry D. Weiss, Gregory Hart, Daniel L. McGee & Sandra D’Estelle,
Health Status of Illiterate Adults: Relation Between Literacy and Health Status Among
Persons with Low Literacy Skills, 5 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 257, 257 (1992) (noting
that millions of persons in the U.S. “lack basic reading skills” or have only
“rudimentary reading skills that are not sufficient to permit full participation in
society’s economic and social activities.”).
144. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 114.
145. See id. at 114–15 (explaining that the second page of the agreement
contains a statement, acknowledged by the defendant-physician’s medical staff
member, that the arbitration agreement was explained to the patient).
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The court also referred to affidavits provided by the patient’s
sister-in-law and the defendant-physician. The sister-in-law had
accompanied the patient to the appointment at which the
arbitration agreement was executed. Her testimony revealed that
the patient asked the defendant-physician about the meaning of
the arbitration agreement, to which he replied, “It’s so you won’t
146
sue me.”
The physician-defendant’s affidavit indicated that the patient
“signed the agreement and initialed his understanding on the
147
second page of the agreement before meeting with him.” The
physician then met with the patient and confirmed that the patient
had read the arbitration agreement, “had its terms explained to
148
him, fully understood its terms, and consented to the surgery.”
This confirmation was based on his recollection of his conversation
with the patient and the patient’s signature and initials appearing
149
on the agreement.
The court next held that “[t]he language in this agreement is
150
neither complex nor convoluted.” Here, the court relied on the
boldness of the print, a statement in the agreement explaining its
terms, a signature of the patient on a page of the agreement, the
patient having initialed each term, “denoting his understanding of
151
the terms,” and the patient having initialed the agreement to
indicate “he was provided an opportunity to inquire about the
152
agreement’s terms.”
Then, curiously, the court stated that
“[plaintiffs] may not escape the agreement by simply stating [the
patient] did not read the agreement or have it read to him or
153
understand its terms.” The court did not address whether this
patient had the wherewithal to understand the arbitration
provision, and simply signed a document given to him in order to
receive the medical treatment he desired.
The court next addressed contracts of adhesion and
voluntariness relating to the claim that the patient had no choice
but to execute the agreement. The court dispatched this argument,

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115–16.
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noting that the agreement, prepared by defense counsel, provided
that the “[p]atient is not in need of emergency care or under
154
immediate stress,” the patient had the right to “make written
changes in the Arbitration Agreement if they so desire and present
155
these to the Clinic for approval,” the patient could rescind the
agreement within fifteen days, and that the patient’s “surgery was
not scheduled until nineteen days after he executed the
156
agreement . . . ,” presumably to suggest that the patient had the
time and resources to seek legal counsel to consult about
arbitration. In my estimation, this position defies logic and, again,
suggests that the patient was fully involved in a business transaction.
Of course, the court’s position assumes that the patient knew that
he executed an arbitration agreement, fully understood what it
meant, including the concept of rescission and the waiver of basic
legal rights, and would have had the presence of mind and
capability of consulting with legal counsel. Undoubtedly, the
patient simply desired medical treatment. In any event, for the
aforementioned reasons, the court concluded that the arbitration
157
agreement did not suffer from procedural unconscionability.
Finally, the court held the arbitration provision was not
substantively unconscionable. The court believed that the
arbitration forum was fair and that the agreement neither limited
the patient’s legal rights or damages nor the defendant-physician’s
158
liability. Therefore, the court held that the trial court incorrectly
denied the motion to compel arbitration, reversed the judgment,
and remanded the case “with instructions . . . compelling the
159
parties to submit their dispute to arbitration.”
A vigorous dissent recognized the patient’s “lack of bargaining
160
161
power” and the one-sidedness of the arbitration provision, and
apparently agreed with the trial court that the arbitration provision
was a take it or leave it proposition. The dissent focused on the
162
state constitutional provision of a right to trial by jury. It noted

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 121.
See id.
See MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31.
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that any interference with that right, including arbitration, must be
163
reviewed with strict scrutiny.
C.

Utah
164

Truth is stranger than fiction. The facts of Sosa v. Paulos, an
opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah, certainly satisfy this maxim.
Here, the patient was to undergo a posterior cruciate ligament
165
reconstruction. “[L]ess than one hour prior to surgery, after Ms.
Sosa was undressed and in her surgical clothing, ‘someone from
Dr. Paulos’ office’ gave her three documents and asked her to sign
166
them,” including an arbitration agreement. No one from the
defendant-physician’s office ever discussed the arbitration
agreement with her and Ms. Sosa executed the agreement without
167
reading it.
At that time, the Utah Arbitration Act contemplated
168
The patient believed that she was
compulsory arbitration.
169
required to sign the agreement as a condition of the treatment.
Utah public policy favored arbitration agreements, including those
170
between physicians and patients.
Post-operatively, the patient suffered a complication and later
171
commenced a medical negligence action. The trial court denied
the defendant-physician’s motion to stay and compel arbitration,
finding the arbitration agreement “procedurally and substantively
172
unconscionable.”

163. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 122.
164. 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).
165. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359. See, e.g., Edward L. Trickey, Rupture of the Posterior
Cruciate Ligament of the Knee, 50 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 334 (1968) (discussing the
mechanism of injury, physical signs of injury, treatment, surgical approach and
repair, and results of treatment).
166. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359.
167. Id.
168. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-3 (1992), repealed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-1417 (West 2007) (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421 (West 2014));
Soriano v. Graul, 186 P.3d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). The statute was subsequently
amended to allow patients to decline arbitration and continue to receive
treatment. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421 (West 2014).
169. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362.
170. Id. at 359.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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The arbitration agreement executed by the patient was quite
173
detailed, covering “all conceivable claims,” providing an arduous
174
cost-shifting process, a fourteen-day revocation provision in favor
175
176
a declaration of patient understanding,
of the patient,
177
severability in the event of an unenforceable provision and the
178
patient’s waiver of the right to a jury or court trial. It should be
emphasized that the patient was confronted with this arbitration
179
agreement less than one hour before surgery.
The court undertook a discussion of substantive and
procedural unconscionability. As to substantive unconscionability—
focusing on the terms of the arbitration agreement—the court
focused on the requirement that the arbitrators would be
orthopedic surgeons and the circumstance in which the patient
180
would be required to absorb the arbitration fees. In, regrettably,
analogizing the physician-patient relationship to a business
transaction, the court noted that “[t]he terms of the contract
should be considered ‘according to the mores and business
181
practices of the time and place.’” The court held that the
arbitrator selection process (neutrally selected orthopedic
surgeons) was not biased in favor of the defendant-physician and
182
was not substantively unconscionable. The court, however, did
hold the payment of costs provision substantively unconscionable
due to cost shifting—“the award of attorney fees to the loser in
183
malpractice arbitration” and the embedding of the provision “in
184
a non-negotiated agreement.” This latter factor also violated Utah
185
public policy.
As to procedural unconscionability, the court noted its
agreement “with the trial court’s conclusion that elements of
173. Id.
174. Id. at 360.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 361.
181. Id. (citing Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah
1985) (quoting ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1963))).
182. Id. at 361.
183. Id. at 362.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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procedural unconscionability surrounded the negotiation of this
186
Actually, there was no negotiation. The court
agreement.”
recognized that the patient was given the agreement on the
precipice of surgery, when the patient “was already in her surgical
187
clothing and in a state of fear and anxiety.” She did not read the
arbitration agreement and it was not explained to her. She did not
have “a meaningful choice with respect to signing the
188
agreement.” It is laudable that the court recognized the patient’s
189
pre-surgical vulnerability, anxiety and apprehension.
The court then addressed the issue of whether the patient
could have invoked the revocation clause of the arbitration
agreement, giving the patient “fourteen days to unilaterally review
190
and revoke the agreement.” Apparently, the record on appeal did
not clearly address “whether Ms. Sosa actually received a signed
191
copy of the arbitration agreement following her surgery.” If she
had, a majority of the court would order the trial court to sever the
unconscionable cost-shifting provision and enforce the remainder
of the arbitration agreement if the patient was not “precluded from
192
exercising her right to revoke.” Why a majority of the court would
think that a post-operative patient would be inclined to revisit an
arbitration agreement, which the patient was likely unaware of in
the first instance, is unexplained. Ultimately, the majority held that
the defendant-physician’s “behavior in negotiating the agreement
was procedurally unconscionable” and that the arbitration cost193
shifting provision was substantively unconscionable. The issue on
remand was the potential enforceability of the remainder of the
arbitration agreement.
D.

Florida

The opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida in
194
Santiago v. Baker is the opinion first referred to in this paper and
is the opinion which piqued my interest in the compulsory
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 362–63 (emphasis added).
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id.
Id.
135 So. 3d 569, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
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arbitration of medical liability claims. Santiago involves a
compulsory arbitration agreement executed by an obstetricalgynecological patient on her initial visit to a women’s medical
195
practice. Florida had a statute providing for voluntary, binding
196
arbitration of medical negligence claims but the patient never
invoked the statute. Instead, upon the patient’s filing of a medical
negligence claim, the defendant successfully moved to compel
197
arbitration pursuant to the private arbitration agreement.
Without detailed analysis or discussion, the court stated, “Ms.
Santiago willingly signed the arbitration agreement. Our record
198
reflects no coercion or duress.” In conclusory fashion, the court
held that the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor
199
substantively unconscionable.
Santiago simply stands for the
proposition that compulsory, private arbitration agreements
between physicians and patients do not violate Florida public
200
policy.
The concurring opinion focused on the waiver of the right of
trial by jury by non-signatories to the arbitration agreement—the
patient’s husband and child—but also referred to literacy and
health literacy by stating:
But somehow in deference to the supposed economic
efficiency of arbitration, our society seems to be more and
more willing to allow the use of form contracts, not
subject to negotiation, that force patients, the elderly, the
marginally literate, and ordinary consumers of everyday
products to waive their constitutional right to trial by jury
in common law cases—before the common law cause of
action even exists—in order to receive basic goods and
201
services.
Nevertheless, of course, the concurrence supported the notion
of the binding, private, compulsory arbitration agreement between
a physician and a patient.

195.
196.
2014).
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Medical Malpractice and Related Matters, 45 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766 (West
Santiago, 135 So. 3d at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 572.
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Not long after Santiago, a different appellate district issued an
202
unpublished opinion and disagreed with Santiago’s recognition of
non-statutory medical arbitration agreements that do not adopt all
of the statutory provisions. Presumably then, this opinion in Crespo
203
v. Hernandez would not endorse a take-it-or-leave-it arbitration
provision but only an agreement which provided for voluntary
arbitration, which could be invoked by physician or patient.
E.

Nevada

In 1985, the Supreme Court of Nevada, in Obstetrics &
Gynecologists v. Pepper, held unenforceable an arbitration agreement
that a patient was required to execute as a condition of
204
treatment. Here, a patient appeared at a clinic seeking oral
205
contraceptives. Pursuant to the custom and practice of the clinic,
the following would have occurred: the receptionist handed “the
patient the arbitration agreement along with two information
206
sheets;” the receptionist informed the patient that any of the
patient’s questions about the arbitration agreement would be
207
answered; the patient executed the agreement as a condition of
208
209
treatment; a physician executed the arbitration agreement; and
the arbitration agreement did not provide the patient a right to
210
The arbitration agreement covered all disputes,
revoke it.
211
provided for binding arbitration, and waived the right to a trial.
The patient signed the agreement although she had no
recollection of doing so and no recollection that it was explained to
212
her.
Presumably after taking the oral contraceptive, the patient
213
“suffered a cerebral incident which left her partially paralyzed.”
She filed suit for medical negligence, urging that the oral

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Crespo v. Hernandez, 151 So.3d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id.
693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
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contraceptive “was contraindicated by her medical history.” The
defendant moved the court to stay the litigation and compel
215
216
arbitration. The motions were denied and the appeal followed.
First, the Nevada Supreme Court embarked on a discussion of
217
adhesion contracts. It focused on the “take it or leave it” feature
of the agreement—an agreement “prepared by [the] . . . medical
clinic and presented to [the patient] as a condition of
218
treatment.” It did note that an adhesion contract which met “the
reasonable expectations of the weaker . . . party and is not unduly
219
oppressive” will be enforceable. Next, the Nevada Supreme Court
concluded that the patient did not consent to the provisions of the
220
arbitration agreement, finding no “meeting of the minds” and a
221
lack of “informed consent.” This finding was based on the
patient’s inability to recall “receiving any information regarding the
222
terms of the arbitration agreement.”
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of
the motions to stay the action and to order arbitration. Essentially,
the Supreme Court treated this dispute as a contract matter,
without a mention of general literacy, health literacy or the medical
ethics of proposing such an agreement.

214. Id. See Alan B. Grindal et al., Cerebral Infarction in Young Adults, 9 STROKE
39, 39–40 (1978) (concluding that oral contraceptive use “may” be an explanation
for increased incidences of cerebral infarction in women of childbearing age);
William D. Odell, An Analysis of the Reported Association of Oral Contraceptives to
Thromboembolic Disease, 122 W. J. MED. 26, 26–32 (1975) (discussing the relationship
between oral contraceptives and cerebral infarction).
215. Pepper, 693 P.2d at 1260.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1261.
220. Id. “Meeting of the minds” refers to a classic theory of contract law. See
Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000); E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in
the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967).
221. “Informed consent” is typically considered the physician’s obligation to
disclose the risks, benefits, complications of and alternatives to a recommended
treatment or procedure for a patient. See Marc. D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent and
the Differential Diagnosis: How the Law Can Overestimate Patient Autonomy and
Compromise Health Care, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 349, 352 (2014) (citing Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
222. Pepper, 693 P.2d at 1261.
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Arizona
223

In Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., the Supreme
Court of Arizona considered the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement a patient was required to execute “prior to undergoing
224
a clinical abortion.” The facts reveal that the patient was young,
unmarried, of modest means, and the father-to-be insisted on the
225
abortion—her parents wished otherwise. By affidavit, the patient
“describes the time as one of considerable confusion and emotion
226
and physical turmoil for her.”
The relevant facts of the patient’s encounter with the medical
clinic are these: the patient “was escorted into an adjoining room
and asked to complete three forms, one of which [was] the
227
agreement to arbitrate.” The arbitration agreement applied to all
disputes with the clinic, provided for binding arbitration, and
228
further provided that the arbitrators would be licensed OB-GYNs.
The patient completed the forms, was not given copies of them,
229
and received no explanation of the arbitration agreement. The
patient was told to return the next morning for the abortion
procedure, which she did, and the abortion was performed. A
complication occurred—a punctured uterus—requiring further
230
treatment.
It prompted the filing of a medical negligence
complaint.
The complaint was met by a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff
submitted “uncontroverted” affidavits in response, apparently
indicating that she “could recall completing and signing the
medical history and consent-to-operate forms, but could not recall
231
signing the agreement to arbitrate.” Treating the motion as one
223. 840 P.2d 1013, 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
224. Id. A clinical abortion has been defined as “[a]n abortion of a clinical
pregnancy which takes place between the diagnosis of pregnancy and 20
completed weeks’ gestational age.” Fernando Zegers-Hochschild et al., The
ICMART Glossary on ART Terminology, 21 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1968, 1969 (2006).
225. Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1014.
226. Id. See Catherine T. Coyle, Priscilla K. Coleman & Vincent M. Rue,
Inadequate Preabortion Counseling and Decision Conflict as Predictors of Subsequent
Relationship Difficulties and Psychological Stress in Men and Women, 16 TRAUMATOLOGY
16 (2010) (providing a discussion of unplanned pregnancy as a “crisis situation”).
227. Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1014.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1015.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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for summary judgment, due to the trial court’s consideration of the
affidavits, the trial court granted summary judgment for the clinic
and denied the patient’s motion for further relief. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement, despite
its adhesive character, was “enforceable because it did not fall
outside plaintiff’s reasonable expectations and was not
232
unconscionable.”
The Arizona Supreme Court refused to broadly address the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement, declining to establish a
233
“‘bright-line rule’ of broad applicability.” Based on the specific,
“undisputed facts,” the court held the arbitration agreement
234
unenforceable.
The court had no difficulty in identifying the arbitration
agreement as a contract of adhesion. The patient’s execution of the
agreement was a condition of treatment, the agreement was not
negotiated, it required the arbitrators to be OB-GYNs and its terms
235
were not explained to the patient. The arbitration agreement,
236
therefore, had all of the characteristics of a contract of adhesion.
Next, the court considered the reasonable expectations of the
patient and enforceability of an adhesion contract. Here, the
patient did not recall signing the agreement or having the clinic
237
explain it to her. The clinic “did not show whether [the patient]
238
was required to sign the form or forfeit treatment.” Furthermore,
the court emphasized that the provision requiring waiver of the
right to a jury trial was inconspicuous, and “that waiver of such
fundamental rights was beyond the reasonable expectations of [the
239
patient].”
Referring again to the patient’s vulnerability, the court noted
that she “was under a great deal of emotional stress, had only a
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1016.
236. Id. at 1015.
237. Id. at 1017.
238. Id. The arbitration agreement is appended to the opinion as Appendix A.
Id. at 1023. It states: “it is understood by the Patient that he or she is not required
to use the aforesaid Doctor and that there are numerous other physicians in
Phoenix, Arizona who are qualified to provide the same services as aforesaid
Doctor.” Id. This statement more than suggests that treatment was conditioned on
patient’s execution of the arbitration agreement. Id.
239. Id. at 1017.
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high school education, was not experienced in commercial matters,
240
The arbitration
and is still not sure ‘what arbitration is.’”
agreement was not encompassed by the patient’s reasonable
241
expectations and was unenforceable.
A rather vigorous dissent suggests that the patient, “an adult,
242
signed the document” and should be bound by the agreement.
Strangely, the dissent believes that the patient may have desired
243
arbitration and that there is no harm in the arbitration process. It
noted the patient’s opportunity to read the arbitration agreement,
which “was legible and was hardly hidden from [the patient’s]
244
view.”
245
The difficulty with the dissent in Broemmer is that it treats the
arbitration agreement as the result of a business-like negotiation
between the patient and clinic. The majority recognized that the
patient was vulnerable for many reasons, as are many patients.
Patient vulnerability is a characteristic of the physician-patient
relationship and poses a significant roadblock to compulsory
arbitration as a condition of treatment.
G.

Hawaii

In Siopen v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Hawaii considered the enforceability of an arbitration
provision contained in an agreement between a health care
246
provider and a patient’s employer. The patient was a public
school teacher and his health insurance was provided through a
247
union health benefits trust fund. The trust fund contracted with
248
Kaiser for health services. The group agreement between Kaiser
and the union contained an arbitration provision, which applied to
249
all potential claims against Kaiser. The arbitration provision
250
noted that arbitration
contained limitations on discovery,
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1018.
312 P.3d 869 (Haw. 2013).
Id.at 871–72.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 872–73.
Id. at 873.
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251

decisions were “final and binding” and noted a waiver of the right
252
to trial before a jury or court. Kaiser claimed that it was the
employer’s responsibility to make the group agreement available to
253
the employees to review.
The pertinent medical facts involve the patient’s “persistent
254
upper abdominal pain” and his diagnosis with “a very rare,
255
that would be treated
aggressive and fatal form of cancer”
through Kaiser with “a complete surgical resection of [the
256
patient’s] stomach and esophagus.” The patient sought a second
opinion at a university medical center, which concluded Kaiser’s
257
diagnosis was incorrect and different treatment was required.
The patient remained there for treatment, and Kaiser refused to
258
cover the costs.
The patient filed suit against Kaiser based on multiple theories
of liability, including medical negligence, and “sought a
declaration that the mandatory arbitration requirement” was void
and unenforceable claiming it “provides an adjudicatory process
259
that is unconscionable and heavily biased in Kaiser’s favor.” The
patient also alleged “that the arbitration provision is a provision of
adhesion for which [the patient] had neither choice nor
260
bargaining power to challenge.” Kaiser responded by filing a
“Motion to Compel Arbitration and Motion to Stay Discovery
261
pending the ruling on the motion to compel.” Essentially, the
patient’s position was that he was completely unaware of the
262
arbitration provision. The trial court disagreed with the patient
263
and compelled arbitration.

251. Id. at 874.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 875.
255. Id. See generally Hannah H. Wong & Peiguo Chu, Immunohistochemical
Features of the Gastrointestinal Tract Tumors, 3 J. GASTROINTESTINAL ONCOLOGY 262
(Sept. 2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3418530.
256. Siopes, 312 P.3d at 875.
257. Id. at 876.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 876–77.
261. Id. at 877.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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The Hawaii Supreme Court focused on contract formation,
stating that “the issue is whether [the patient] assented to the
arbitration provision in the first instance, when he enrolled in the
264
Kaiser plan by signing the Enrollment Form.” The court found
an absence of mutual assent, reasoning the patient was uninformed
of the arbitration provision or that it would be binding upon him,
265
ruling he could not be compelled to participate in arbitration.
Finally, the court noted that the trial court erred by not
considering the unconscionability issue. The court vacated the trial
court’s orders with respect to arbitration and sent the case back to
266
the trial court for further proceedings.
H. What Have We Learned So Far?
Having surveyed the judicial opinions of various states on the
issue of the compulsory arbitration of medical negligence claims, a
rather simple, unhelpful fact is apparent. Courts, primarily using a
basic contract law analysis, may find compulsory arbitration
agreements covering medical negligence claims enforceable or
unenforceable. If forming the physician-patient relationship is seen
as a business transaction, a court will be more likely to enforce an
arbitration agreement on the theory that the agreement is legible,
not hidden, and furthers the policy of the state in preferring
arbitration as an efficient and cost-conscious method of alternative
dispute resolution. The physician-patient relationship, however,
does not derive from an arm’s-length business negotiation. Some
courts have recognized the vulnerability of patients, including
potential literacy issues. Patients are likely to execute whatever
documents are necessary in order to receive treatment. Courts may
understand basic principles of contract law but, in my estimation,
they typically neither understand medicine nor seek to learn about
it when this knowledge can usefully inform judicial decision
267
making.

264. Id. at 880.
265. Id. at 885.
266. Id.
267. This is a problem to which I have previously alluded. See supra notes 204–
11 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir.
2013) (providing Judge Posner’s commentary on a court’s understanding of
medicine).
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Medicine should provide some helpful information about
compulsory arbitration. The remainder of this paper will search
medicine in an effort to discover why medicine encourages patients
to execute arbitration agreements as a condition of treatment and
whether this practice is medically ethical.
VIII. THE MEDICAL PROFESSION HAS SUPPORTED BINDING
ARBITRATION OF MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMS
I do not profess to know when a patient was first asked to
execute an arbitration agreement as a condition of treatment or
when a physician first thought to engage in this practice. It is,
however, possible to trace physician support for binding arbitration
of medical liability claims to 1975. In April of 1975, the president of
the American Society of Internal Medicine (ASIM), Glenn
Molyneaux, M.D., provided “Testimony on Medical Liability” to the
268
Senate Subcommittee on Health. This testimony, undoubtedly
related to tort reform, emphasized that some “undesirable
[medical] outcomes follow appropriate medical care” and that the
legal system fails to distinguish these events from medical
269
negligence. The ASIM proposed legislative “reform of the entire
legal process as it relates to medical liability,” and suggested “that
some form of arbitration would be the most equitable for all parties
270
concerned.”
In fact, in this testimony, the ASIM suggested
271
binding arbitration as a substitute for the jury trial. The testimony
did not address medical treatment conditioned on the patient’s
execution of an arbitration agreement.
272
The American College of Physicians (ACP)
has rather
vigorously supported voluntary arbitration for medical liability
268. See AM. SOC’Y INTERNAL MED., TESTIMONY ON MED. LIAB., 94th Cong., at 1
(1975),
https://www.acponline.org/acp_policy/testimony/medical_liability
_testimony_before_subcommitte_health_us_senate_1975.pdf (“[The] ASIM is a
federation of 51 component societies of internal medicine. It has more than
13,500 members who, by training and practice standards, are recognized as
specialists in internal medicine. Most are private practice internists delivering
primary care, subspecialty care or both.”) (statement of Glenn Molyneaux,
President, ASIM).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 3.
272. See AM. COLL. PHYSICIANS, http://www.acponline.org/about_acp/who
_we_are (last visited Jan 30, 2016) (“[The ACP] is a national organization of
internists” and “is the largest medical-specialty organization and second largest
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claims. Its informational paper from March 1989, on “Medical
Professional Liability” supported “voluntary binding arbitration” as
273
a component of tort reform.
This informational paper was
followed by the ACP’s position paper, “Restructuring The Medical
Professional Liability System,” which similarly supported arbitration
274
as a tort reform measure.
The ACP’s 2003 position paper,
“Reforming The Medical Professional Liability Insurance System”
endorsed federal tort reform legislation, which included
authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to make
grants to states for the development and implementation of ADR
275
276
programs.” The ACP reiterated this recommendation in 2006
277
278
and 2014. In 2014, the American College of Surgeons (ACS)
commented on arbitration of medical liability claims. It published
Surgeons and Medical Liability: A Guide to Understanding Medical
Liability Reform, a “primer to inform ACS fellows about the history
of medical liability as well as alternative, innovative reform
279
approaches to the status quo of tort law in the U.S.” In this
publication, the ACS referred to, but did not recommend,
mandatory pre-dispute binding arbitration, stating that “the
American Arbitration Association . . . does not endorse mandatory
[pre-dispute] binding arbitration for medical liability cases. They
[sic] do not believe a sick patient has a fair amount of bargaining
power when deciding whether or not to accept the arbitration

physician group in the United States.”).
273. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY at 4 (1986),
http://www.acponline.org/acp_policy/policies/medical_professional_liability_19
84.pdf (last visited Oct.18, 2015).
274. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, RESTRUCTURING THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM 3, 4, 5, 16, 17 (1986).
275. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, REFORMING THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE SYSTEM 11 (2003).
276. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, EXPLORING THE USE OF HEALTH COURTS—
ADDENDUM TO “REFORMING THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SYSTEM” 4 (2006).
277. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM: INNOVATIVE
SOLUTIONS FOR A NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 5, 15 (2014).
278. AM. COLL. SURGEONS, http://www.facs.org/about-acs (last visited October
2, 2015) (“The American College of Surgeons (ACS) is a scientific and educational
association of surgeons that was founded in 1913 to improve the quality of care for
the surgical patient by setting high standards for surgical education and practice”).
279. KATHLEEN M. O’NEILL ET AL., THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS,
SURGEONS AND MEDICAL LIABILITY: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL LIABILITY
REFORM 4 (2014).
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280

contract.” Indeed, it seems that the ACS desires that physicians
and patients understand that alternative dispute resolution is an
281
option.
The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
282
(ACOG), through its Committee on Professional Liability, issued
a Committee opinion entitled “Predispute, Voluntary, Binding
283
Arbitration” in 2014. ACOG’s opinion appears supportive of
arbitration of medical liability claims, but steadfastly emphasizes
284
the need for “voluntariness” and that the physician cannot refuse
treatment to a patient who refuses to execute the arbitration
285
This is a laudable position, as it respects the
agreement.
vulnerability of patients and the environment surrounding the
286
physician-patient relationship, including the initial patient visit.
At this juncture, it is fair to state that some courts have
enforced arbitration agreements executed by patients as a
condition of treatment. Furthermore, influential professional
medical associations have advocated the use of arbitration
agreements covering potential medical liability claims. In my
estimation, this is regrettable but should not end the inquiry.
Recognizing that the patients who are asked to execute arbitration
agreements may be ill, in pain, medicated, fearful, unwilling to
confront a physician, and simply incapable of understanding the
gravity of the arbitration agreement, another inquiry remains: is
280. Id. at 17 (citing Erik Moller, Elizabeth Rolph & John Rolph, Arbitration
Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 153
(1997)).
281. O’NEILL ET AL., supra note 279, at 41.
282. The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ objectives
are “to foster and stimulate improvements in all aspects of the health care of
women; to establish and maintain the highest standards of practice; to promote
high ethical standards; to establish and promote policy positions on issues
affecting the specialty of obstetrics and gynecology; and to promote, represent,
and advance the professional and socioeconomic interests of its members.” AM.
CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, BYLAWS 1 (2015).
283. THE AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS COMM. ON PROF’L
LIAB., Predispute, Voluntary, Binding Arbitration, 583 COMMITTEE OPINION 1 (Jan.
2014).
284. Id. at 2.
285. Id.
286. See David H. Sohn, Negligence, Genuine Error, and Litigation, 6 INT’L J. GEN.
MED. 49, 53 (2013) (noting that the practice of requiring the execution of an
arbitration agreement as a condition of treatment may lead to an awkward
discussion of “adversarial postures during the initial physician-patient visit”).
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the practice of requiring patients to execute arbitration agreements
as a condition of treatment medically ethical?
IX. IS THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING PATIENTS TO EXECUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AS A CONDITION OF TREATMENT
MEDICALLY ETHICAL?
A.

The Hippocratic Oath

I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and
Panaceia and all the gods and goddesses, making them my witness,
that I will fulfill according to my ability and judgment this oath and
this covenant:
To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my
parents and to live my life in partnership with him, and if
he is in need of money to give him a share of mine, and to
regard his offspring as equal to my brothers in male
lineage and to teach them this art—if they desire to learn
it—without fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts
and oral instruction and all the other learning to my sons
and to the sons of him who has instructed me and to
pupils who have signed the covenant and have taken an
oath according to the medical law, but to no one else.
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick
according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them
from harm and injustice.
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it,
nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will
not give to a woman an abortive remedy. In purity and
holiness I will guard my life and my art.
I will not use the knife, nor even on sufferers from stone,
but will withdraw in favor of such men as are engaged in
this work.
Whatever house I may visit, I will come for the benefit of
the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all
mischief and in particular sexual relations with both
female and male persons, be they free or slaves.
Whatever I may see or hear in the course of the treatment
in regard to the life of men, which on no account one
must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such
things shameful to be spoken about.
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If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted
to me to enjoy life and art, being honored with fame
among all men for all time to come; if I transgress it and
287
swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot.
It has been well noted that “[t]he Hippocratic Oath has stood
as a major document of medical ethics from antiquity to the
288
current day.” The Oath is routinely administered to medical
289
students. Abundant scholarship makes clear that “there is no
290
such thing as a single, fixed Hippocratic Oath” and the original
291
author of the Oath is unknown. If the Oath has continued
traction for medical ethics, does it at all assist in determining if the
practice of requiring a patient to execute an arbitration agreement
as a condition of treatment is medically ethical?
An examination of the Oath immediately reveals a problem
with its ethical depth. It focuses on the physician and only
minimally speaks to the rights of patients, by nominal references to
292
“injustice.”
The historically recent value attached to patient
autonomy and informed consent is not expressed in classical
293
versions of the Oath. Also absent are “commitments to patient
294
rights.”
Insofar as the Oath compels physicians to “keep [patients]
295
from harm and injustice,” it seems to me that the Oath speaks to
a broad ethical principle—that a physician should avoid using his
or her position of power to take advantage of a vulnerable patient.
Vulnerable patients include those who are ill, medicated, scared,
intimidated by their circumstances—including those who are
literally on the precipice of treatment—and those challenged by
287. Lisa R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: A Dialogue Between
Law and Medicine, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 299 (2002) (citing
Ludwig Edelstein, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 3 (1943)).
288. Hasday, supra note 287 at 301.
289. Id. at 302. See also Lisa Keränen, The Hippocratic Oath as Epideictic Rhetoric:
Reanimating Medicine’s Past for Its Future, 22 J. MED. HUMANITIES 55, 57 (2001);
Emily Woodbury, The Fall of the Hippocratic Oath: Why the Hippocratic Oath Should Be
Discarded in Favor of a Modified Version of Pellegrino’s Precepts, 6 GEO. U. J. HEALTH
SCIS. 9 (2012); Samuel J. Huber, The White Coat Ceremony: A Contemporary Medical
Ritual, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 364, 364 (2003).
290. Keränen, supra note 289, at 56.
291. Id. at 57.
292. Hasday, supra note 287, at 302–03.
293. Keränen, supra note 289, at 60.
294. Id.
295. Hasday, supra note 287, at 299.
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issues of literacy to understand what they are told and what they are
asked to read and sign. “Injustice” is an ominous and broad
concept. Requiring a patient to execute an arbitration agreement
as a condition of treatment may very well constitute an “injustice.”
More modern versions of the Oath are the subject of comment
in medical literature. It is significant that a more modern version of
the Oath may “include assurances of . . . protection of patients’
autonomy, and informed consent or assistance with decision
296
making.” This ethical commitment may very well be at odds with
requiring a patient to execute an arbitration agreement as a
condition of treatment.
If the Oath, at least implicitly, is inconsistent with the practice
of requiring the execution of the arbitration agreement as a
condition of treatment, could it have legal significance? In other
words, does the Oath have the force of law?
Unquestionably, courts recognize the existence of the Oath in
297
various contexts. However, courts also recognize that ethical
standards and codes “are aspirational in nature and not
298
enforceable by law” and “that ethical standards levied within the
299
medical community are not binding on courts.” If a court is not
bound by a statement of medical ethics, then might a court take
such an ethical standard into account as an unconscionability
factor or as evidence of the medical professional’s standard of care?
If so, that a medical ethical principle or standard is not “the law”
would not prohibit its consideration in determining the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement executed by the patient
as a condition of treatment. Therefore, an examination of various
codes of medical ethics is warranted.
296. Howard Markel, “I Swear by Apollo”—On Taking the Hippocratic Oath, 350
N. ENG. J. MED. 2026, 2028 (2004); Robert D. Orr et al., Use of the Hippocratic Oath:
A Review of Twentieth Century Practice and a Content Analysis of Oaths Administered in
Medical School in the U.S. and Canada in 1993, 8 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 377, 382 (1997).
297. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014)
(physician inquiry into patient private matters); O’Rear v. R.H., 69 So. 3d 106
(Ala. 2011) (sexual contact with patient); Acosta v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 149 (Fla.
1996); Morrison v. Malmquist, 62 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1953) (disclosure of privileged
information); Finucan v. Md. Bd. Physician Quality Servs., 846 A.2d 377 (Md.
2004) (physician not to engage in sexual relationship with patient); Bryson v.
Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1988) (disclosure of confidences); Steinberg v.
Jensen, 534 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1995) (confidentiality).
298. Bryson, 749 P.2d at 114.
299. Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 156 (Ky. 2015).
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American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics
300

301

The AMA has published a Code of Medical Ethics, which
contains principles of medical ethics and opinions of the Council
302
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. The following principles and
opinions may have relevance to the practice of requiring patients to
execute arbitration agreements as a condition of treatment:
Preamble
The medical profession has long subscribed to a body of
ethical statements developed primarily for the benefit of
the patient. As a member of this profession, a physician
must recognize responsibility to patients first and
foremost, as well as to society, to other health
professionals, and to self. The following Principles
adopted by the American Medical Association are not
laws, but standards of conduct that define the essentials of
honorable behavior for the physician. . . .
VI. A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate
patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose
whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the
environment in which to provide medical care. . . .
IX. A physician shall support access to medical care for all
303
people.
Opinion 8.0501—Professionalism and Contractual Relations
Physicians are free to enter into a wide range of
contractual arrangements. However, physicians should
not sign contracts containing provisions that may
undermine their ethical obligation to advocate for patient
300. The AMA, established in 1847, is a voluntary medical association that
“has promoted scientific advancement, improved public health, and invested in
the doctor and patient relationship.” See Our History, AM. MED. ASS’N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-history.page (last visited Jan
30, 2016). In 2012, the AMA had 224,503 members. AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT ON
PERFORMANCE, ACTIVITIES, AND STATUS IN 2012, 9 (2013).
301. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2014).
302. “The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) is one of three
components of the Ethics Group of the American Medical Association,” which
“has two key responsibilities: To maintain and update the . . . Code of Medical
Ethics,” and “[t]o promote adherence to the professional ethical standards set out
in the Code though its judicial function.” Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AM.
MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/amacouncils /council-ethical-judicial-affairs.page (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
303. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 301 at xv.
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welfare. Therefore, before entering into contractual
agreements to provide services that directly or indirectly
impact patient care, physicians should negotiate the
removal of any terms, such as financial incentives or
administrative conditions, that are known to compromise
professional judgment or integrity. Particularly, when
contractual
compensation
varies
according
to
performance (see Opinion 8.054, “Financial Incentives
and the Practice of Medicine”), physicians should beware
of incentives that may adversely impact patient care. (VI,
304
VIII)
Opinion 9.06—Free Choice
Free choice of physicians is the right of every individual.
One may select and change at will one’s physicians, or
one may choose a medical care plan such as that provided
by a closed panel or group practice or health
maintenance or service organization. The individual’s
freedom to select a preferred system of health care and
free competition among physicians and alternative
systems of care are prerequisites of ethical practice and
optimal patient care.
In choosing to subscribe to a health maintenance or
service organization or in choosing or accepting
treatment in a particular hospital, the patient is thereby
accepting limitations upon free choice of medical services.
The need of an individual for emergency treatment in
cases of accident or sudden illness may, as a practical
matter, preclude free choice of a physician, particularly
where there is loss of consciousness.
Although the concept of free choice ensures that an
individual can generally choose a physician, likewise a
physician may decline to accept that individual as a
patient. In selecting the physician of choice, the patient
may sometimes be obliged to pay for medical services that
305
might otherwise be paid by a third party. (VI)
Opinion 9.0651—Financial Barriers to Health Care Access
Health care is a fundamental human good because it
affects our opportunity to pursue life goals, reduces our
pain and suffering, helps prevent premature loss of life,
304.
305.

Id. at 246.
Id. at 355.
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and provides information needed to plan for our lives. As
professionals, physicians individually and collectively have
an ethical responsibility to ensure that all persons have
access to needed care regardless of their economic means.
In view of this obligation:
(1) Individual physicians should take steps to promote
access to care for individual patients.
(2) Individual physicians should help patients obtain
needed care through public or charitable programs when
patients cannot do so themselves.
(3) Physicians, individually and collectively through their
professional organizations and institutions, should
participate in the political process as advocates for
patients (or support those who do) so as to diminish
financial obstacles to access health care.
(4) The medical profession must work to ensure that
societal decisions about the distribution of health
resources safeguard the interests of all patients and
306
promote access to health services.
Opinion 9.12—Patient-Physician Relationship: Respect for Law
and Human Rights
The creation of the patient-physician relationship is
contractual in nature. Generally, both the physician and
the patient are free to enter into or decline the
relationship. A physician may decline to undertake the
care of a patient whose medical condition is not within
the physician’s current competence. However, physicians
who offer their services to the public may not decline to
accept patients because of race, color, religion, national
origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or any other
basis that would constitute invidious discrimination.
Furthermore, physicians who are obligated under preexisting contractual arrangements may not decline to
accept patients as provided by those arrangements. (I, III,
307
V, VI)
Opinion 10.05—Potential Patients
(1) Physicians must keep their professional obligations to
provide care to patients in accord with their prerogative

306.
307.

Id. at 361.
Id. at 379.
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to choose whether to enter into a patient-physician
relationship. . . .
(4) Physicians, as professionals and members of society,
should work to ensure access to adequate health care
(Opinion 10.01, “Fundamental Elements of the PatientPhysician Relationship”). Accordingly, physicians have an
obligation to share in providing charity care (Opinion
9.065, “Caring for the Poor”) but not to the degree that
would seriously compromise the care provided to existing
patients. When deciding whether to take on a new
patient, physicians should consider the individual’s need
for medical service along with the needs of their current
patients. Greater medical necessity of a service engenders
308
a stronger obligation to treat. (I, VI, VIII, IX)
Distilled from the aforementioned principles and opinions are
a few common threads, sometimes laudable, sometimes conflicting.
The AMA clearly promotes patient access to healthcare and
freedom of contract. Patients should be able to choose their
physicians but physicians are not obligated to accept all patients.
Contracts entered into by physician should not contain “provisions
that may undermine their ethical obligation to advocate for patient
309
welfare.” Here, the AMA may not have contemplated the ethical
ramifications of arbitration provisions but the required execution
of these provisions is arguably not in the best interests of patients.
C.

American College of Physicians (ACP) Ethics Manual
310

The ACP “is a national organization of internists,” “the
largest medical-specialty organization and second-largest physician
311
group in the United States.” The ACP’s Ethical Manual, Sixth
Edition, was published in 2012.
The introductory portion of the ethics manual provides that
“[c]urrent understanding of medical ethics is based on the
312
principles from which positive duties emerge.” Included in these
ethical principles “is respect for patient autonomy—the duty to
308. Id. at 422.
309. Id. at 246.
310. AM. COLL. PHYSICIANS, http://www.acponline.org/about_acp/who_we
_are (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
311. Id; see also Charles S. Bryan, The Art of Medicine—Osler Redux: The American
College of Physicians at 100, 385 LANCET 1720 (2015).
312. Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 156 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 73, 74 (2012).
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protect and foster a patient’s free, uncoerced choices.” The
practice of requiring the execution of an arbitration agreement as
a condition of treatment appears coercive and inconsistent with
this principle.
The section of the manual entitled “The Physician and the
Patient” recognizes “the imbalance of power between patient and
314
physician.”
The imbalance of power relates to patient
vulnerability, a topic previously discussed in this article, which
should be considered by courts in determining the
unconscionability of an arbitration agreement.
The section of the manual entitled “Initiating and
Discontinuing the Patient-Physician Relationship” requires the
physician to “work toward an understanding of the patient’s health
problems, concerns, goals and expectations. . . . The physician has
a duty to promote patient understanding and should be aware of
315
barriers, including health literacy issues for the patient.” Should a
patient expect to execute an arbitration agreement that the patient
does not understand? I believe the answer is a resounding, “No.”
Finally, in the section of the manual entitled “The Changing
Practice Environment,” the physician is admonished that the
physician is the patient’s health care agent and must advocate
“through the necessary avenues to obtain treatment that is essential
to the individual patient’s care regardless of the barriers that may
316
discourage the physician from doing so.”
The practice of
requiring the execution of an arbitration agreement as a condition
of treatment appears inconsistent with the duty of patient advocacy
317
and with an agent’s classic duty of loyalty.
D.

American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) Code of Ethics
and Professionalism for Orthopedic Surgeons

The AAOS “is the preeminent provider of musculosketal
318
education to orthopaedic surgeons and others in the world.” It
has published a “Code of Ethics and Professionalism for
313. Id.
314. Id. at 75.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 87.
317. See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, § 68 (3d
ed. 2001).
318. About the AAOS, AM. ACAD. ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS, http://www.aaos.org
/about/about.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
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Orthopedic Surgeons,” “primarily for the benefit of . . . patients”
and orthopedic surgeons, and to “serve as guides for conduct of the
320
physician in the physician-patient relationship.” The following
are excerpts of the AAOS Code:
The Physician-Patient Relationship
A. The orthopaedic profession exists for the primary
purpose of caring for the patient. The physician-patient
relationship is the central focus of all ethical concerns.
B. The physician-patient relationship has a contractual
basis and is based on confidentiality, trust, and honesty.
Both the patient and the orthopaedic surgeon are free to
enter or discontinue the relationship within any existing
constraints of a contract with a third party. . . .
C. The orthopaedic surgeon may choose whom he or she
will serve. . . .
Relationship to the Public
....
D. The orthopaedic surgeon may enter into a contractual
relationship with a group, a prepaid practice plan, or a
hospital. The physician has an obligation to serve as the
patient’s advocate and to ensure that the patient’s welfare
321
remains the paramount concern.
These principles are quite similar to those previously
discussed. They reveal the inherent conflict between the autonomy
of the physician and the physician’s duty to serve and advocate for
the patient. Again, the practice of requiring patients to execute
arbitration agreements as a condition of treatment seems at odds
with the duty to advocate on behalf of vulnerable patients.
X. PATIENT LITERACY
A brief mention of literacy is appropriate here. Much has been
written about health literacy and general literacy in the population.
It is not an understatement to suggest that it is a challenge for
patients to communicate with their physicians and to understand
322
Laypersons with
health related information they are given.

319. Code of Ethics and Professionalism for Orthopedic Surgeons, AM. ACAD.
ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS, http://www.aaos.org/about/papers/ethics /code.asp (last
visited Oct. 15, 2015).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Williams et al., supra note 126.
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limited literacy are unlikely to understand medicine. This problem
is exacerbated when a patient is given an arbitration agreement to
execute. What is the likelihood that a patient will understand a
323
legal document of such significance? Here, neither the physician
nor the physician’s office can meaningfully advocate for the
patient. As non-lawyers, they cannot advise the patient of the legal
impact of executing the agreement. Patient literacy should
constitute a component of the unconscionability discussion. I
suggest that challenges to patient literacy support a presumption
that arbitration agreements covering medical liability claims,
executed as a condition of treatment, are unconscionable.
XI. CONCLUSION
Physicians Should Abandon the Practice of Requiring Patients to Execute
Arbitration Agreements as a Condition of Treatment—Courts Should Hold
These Agreements Unconscionable
Forcing a patient to execute an arbitration agreement as a
condition of treatment is simply an unfortunate, and possibly
unethical, aspect of medical practice. Physicians must recognize
that patients are not consumers involved in commercial
transactions. I am not advocating consumer arbitration of disputes
in other contexts. My point is that the patient is different than the
classic consumer in significant respects, well described recently by
Goldstein and Bowers as follows:
[A]n individual’s use of the health care system is likely to
be involuntary and, in this sense, necessary. . . . As
compared to other marketplace transactions, this results
in an almost powerless buyer. . . . Envisioning the
individual as a consumer might result in a more businesslike attitude towards the interaction on the part of the
physician. . . . Instead of a collaborative decision-making
324
process, the interactions could become adversarial.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, patients are ill, anxious,
frightened, dependent, in need of treatment, often medicated, and
often challenged with literacy issues. Patients, in general, are
unlikely to understand arbitration agreements, will not likely have
the wherewithal, resources or time necessary to seek an attorney’s

323. White, supra note 124.
324. Melissa M. Goldstein & Daniel G. Bowers, The Patient as Consumer:
Empowerment or Commodification?, 43 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 162, 163 (2015).
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opinion on the agreement, and will likely sign whatever documents
are given to them in order to begin medical treatment. These
problems are even more extreme when the arbitration agreement
is given to the patient who is about to undergo a procedure that
will not be performed if the patient “elects” not to execute the
agreement.
Physicians should be patient advocates. Various principles of
medical ethics, previously discussed, typically evidence a collision
course of physician and patient interests. Physicians should enjoy
the freedom of contract and the right to choose their patients,
within reason. But patients need access to health care, and
physicians should advocate for patients in this regard. Physicians
should not force arbitration agreements upon patients. Doing so
simply sets an adversarial tone to the physician-patient
325
relationship.
Courts considering the enforceability of adhesive arbitration
provisions covering medical liability claims should refer to medical
ethical principles as well as patient characteristics and conclude
that these provisions are unconscionable. It is not reasonable to
require patients to waive fundamental legal rights when they are
most vulnerable and in need of healthcare.

325.
181.

See Sohn, supra note 286 at 53; Moller, Rolph, & Rolph, supra note 280 at
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